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Racial conflict in South Africa stems from the determination 
of the white population to perpetuate its power and privilege (by means 
of political domination), and African opposition to this control. This 
African opposition derives, over time, from the common values which a 
mission-based education and urban-industrial society have created over 
time, and which lead Africans to assert their common right to equality 
and economic opportunity. (1) During the nineteen-fifties and early 
'sixties, the escalation of political conflict between the races was the 
result of intensified efforts by the whites to entrench their position, 
and increased black efforts to challenge and resist this hegemony. (2) 
Whites became increasingly dependent on coercion as a means of conflict 
resolution. The policy of separate development is a white attempt. to 
broaden the range of choices for conflict resolution open to them, and 
thus lower this dependence on coercion. Through territorial 
Balkanization of the country, it is hoped to expel racial conflict from 
the areas of white privilege (conflict has been concentrated in the 
main urban centres of the country) and orient African aspirations 
towards rural whomelandsll or "Bantus tansf1. ( 3) 
The Bantustan policy rejects racial integration, which would 
end the white monopoly of privilege, and seeks instead to bplement a 
system of llpolitical independence with economic interdependence" . (4) 
To this end, Africans are expelled from the towns when they cease to be 
employed by whites (5); a special system of education aims to keep 
Africans as a low-paid proletariat (6); industrialization of the borders 
of the Bantustans rather than inside them ensures that capital resources 
will remain in white hands while labour resides in "another country" (7); 
and Africans are granted Bantustan citizenship while their status as 
South African nationals is legally abrogated. (8) 
But conflict in South Africa is closely related to African 
aspirations and their perceptions of deprivation. Unless the 
Bantustans can satisfy such aspirations, and unless Africans cease to 
utilize white privilege as a referent of grievances, the attempt to 
expel conflict from "white areas" is likely to fail. 
Conflict Ekternalization 
From 1943, the claims put forward by Africans, mainly in the 
cities, for a ucommon societyt1 took an increasingly militant form, and 
were strongly resisted by the government. For the whites to accept the 
common society would mean the abandonment of privileges. The extension 
of citizenship rights to black South Africans would erode and destroy 
the pattern of exploitative social relationships developed over two 
centuries of racial contact. (9) To maintain such privilege, segregation, 
the denial of a common citizenship and common values, is propounded and 
stubbornly defended. 
The rationale for the policy was explicitly stated as early as 
1922, when the Stallard Commission laid down that the African ttshould 
only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the 
white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the 
needs of the white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so 
to minister". (10) This view was incorporated into much subsequent 
legislation, with regard to passes in particular, and was the basic 
principle underlying the Hertzog Acts of 1936. (11) But the African who 
came to minister remained to minister: the African urban population 
grew rapidly (particularly during the early !forties) and became 
increasingly rooted in the towns. In many cases individuals had no 
experience of rural life. 
The proliferation of shanty towns around the main cities, as a 
result of the wartime migration from the Reserves, caused the Smuts 
government to appoint a Commission under Justice Fagan to re-examine the 
ltproblemll of urban Africans. The Fagan Report, in essence, refuted the 
Stallard dictum, stating that the view of Africans as temporary visitors 
to the towns was no longer founded in reality. (12) The election of the 
Nationalist Government under Malan in 1948 constituted a rededication to 
the Stallard principle and ensured that Fagants views were never 
considered. 
The 'fifties indicated that little more was conceived of 
apartheid than a rigid intensification of traditional segregation and 
repression of African demands for civil rights. But the intensification 
led to a rapid escalation of urban protest until, by the early 'sixties, 
the government was almost totally dependent on coercion to maintain 
itself in power. (13) Concomitant with this escalation of conflict (and 
an intensification of international hostility to white domination) came 
the rapid definition of the apartheid policy, most particularly those 
aspects dealing with police control and with the conversion of the 
Native Reserves into Bantu Homelands or Bantustans. By creating 
Bantustans, it was hoped that African political aspirations could be 
shifted from the urban areas to the fragmented tribal environment. The 
essential feature of this strategy was the attempt to expel conflict 
from the areas of white affluence; it can thus be designated a strategy 
of conflict externalization. 
The plan is based on the fact that South Africa is still a 
society in transition - a triad of social structures (the subsistence, 
rural economy; the commercial platteland; and the urban industrial 
centres) can be crudely but usefully identified. The urban, industrial 
society (comprising some 4Pb of the population) is the centre of the 
conflict system. There the aspirations shared by the different races 
are increasingly broadened by economic integration, while those values 
peculiar to each race narrow in scope over time. (14) But it is a 
society in which shared aspirations cannot be acknowledged in a common 
citizenship because of ethnically based patterns of privilege and 
deprivation. On the other hand, the subsistence economy of the eroded, 
overstocked and overcrowded reserves (housing another third of the 
population) is devoid of racial interaction and of white economic 
resources (or any other kind for that matter). The main export of this 
economy is cheap labour, and this supply is guaranteed by the poverty 
of these areas. (15) Hence whites do not feel economically or 
politically threatened by the subsistence economy. This sector becomes, 
in consequence, the "traditional homelandv of the African population; 
here it is allowed rights of citizenship. 
But while the ultimate political prospects for the Bantustans 
have purposely been kept vague by white politicians, government 
spokesmen have made clear that the traditional pattern of labour 
relations is to be retained. The African is to continue to minister; 
his grievances rather than his labour are to be externalized. (16) 
Further, within the Bantustans, the strategy seeks to reskore power to 
the traditional aristocracy at the expense of the educated middle class 
which led the articulation of African grievances throughout this 
century. 
The constitutional arrangements in the Bantustans are heavily 
weighted to ensure control of local affairs by the chiefs (who are all 
paid by a government which ultimately sanctions their accession); at 
the same time, great pressure is being exerted against the urban middle 
class to leave the towns and settle in the Reserves. (17) In this way 
it is hoped that conflict between the races will be replaced by 
competition among Africans for the limited resources of the Bantustans. 
Just as attempts were made in colonial Africa to resurrect the 
traditional aristocracy, in the face of the modernization process 
instituted by colonialism, so in South Africa, where social change has 
progressed to a far greater degree, the same attempt is being made - 
but with the determined application of an enormous coercive machinery 
as an important additional factor. 
In sum, then, conflict externalization seeks to (a) displace 
conflict from its traditional pattern of confrontation between the 
races to one of competition within each racial group; (b) introduce 
an element of non-realistic conflict (18) so that Africans struggle 
against each other for the political goods of the Bantustans, instead of 
for those of the whole country; (c) relocate conflict geographically, 
narrowing the scope from the total, multiracial and multiethnic society 
to the racially and ethnically exclusive confines of the Bantustan; and 
(d) change the "leadership class" of African society from the urban- sad 
mission-created Blite , with its essentially urban perspective, to the 
chief, with his rural, tribally fragmented perceptions. 
Creating the Transkei 
The official blueprint for the Bantustan strategy is the 
Tomlinson Commission Report. In fact, government has been extremely 
selective in accepting its recommendations. (19) Instead, the 
institutional structure of the Transkei is based largely on the old 
Bunga system (20), as elaborated gradually over a decade in response to 
mounting internal and international pressure on the government. 
In 1951, the Bmtu Authorities Act returned to the chiefs 
powers which they had previously lost to white Native Commissioners and 
Magistrates. The previous system had legally recognized white 
domination (and the erosion of tribal society through social change) by 
implementing direct white control over rural Africans. The Bantu 
Authorities Act not only attempted to turn back the clock by recreating 
indirect rule, but also sought to obviate the process of social change 
which had yielded a new black elite and undermined the value of the old 
one. This was done by making chiefs local administrators implementing 
government policy. The chiefs flexed their new muscles somewhat 
zealously and, since many of these affected the traditional use of 
land and the traditional judicial role of the chief (by giving the 
chiefs a role in land rehabilitation policies and widening their 
jurisdiction over local offences subject to penalties of a fine or 
banishment), peasant violence and protest almost inevitably followed in 
many parts of the country. In the Transkei there was a major revolt 
through 1959 and 1960, during which several chiefs and headmen were 
killed while others fled. The revolt was eventually quelled by a major 
police and army operation. (21) 
When introducing the Act, Dr. Verwoerd strongly denied that it 
would ever result in the creation of autonomous African states, or that 
it implied the Balkanization of the country. After much rural protest, 
however, Verwoerd stated (during the debate on the Promotion of Bantu 
Self-Government Act of 1959, which set up the'constitutional machinery 
for the creation of  autonomous ~omelands") that African self-government 
was a moral necessity as well as an alternative to the need to share 
central power structures. (22) Although he did not foresee the need for 
such Bantustans for a long time, Verwoerd found the matter more urgent 
only two years later. In 1961, after the Transkei revolt and the 
Sharpeville crisis, with international pressure mounting steadily, he 
stated categorically that the Bantustans could develop into independent 
black states (which had previously not been contemplated), although 
"this is not what we would have preferred to seeff. (23) In the following 
year, he introduced a bill into Parliament which created the machinery 
for lllocal autonomy" for the Transkei. This, stated Verwoerd, would 
hopefully provide Western nations with the grounds to reject Afro-Asian 
pressures regarding South Africa' S policies. (24) 
The Bantustan policy thus evolved not only in response to long- 
term dangers perceived by the white polity but also on an ad hoc basis, 
in response to immediate pressures. 
The Transkei Constitution Act of 1963 created a Transkei 
Legislative Assembly comprising 64 chiefs (sitting ex officio) and 45 
members elected by universal adult suffrage. The act also authorized a 
Cabinet of 6 holding the portfolios of Chief Minister and Finance, 
Education, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, and Roads and Forestry. 
Control of defence, foreign affairs, the police and magistracy, 
information, posts and telegraphs, health, railways, criminal justice, 
and white residents of the Transkei, remained with the Republic. Since 
the budget was allocated by Pretoria, education is governed by the Bmtu 
Education Act, agriculture is based on Tomlinson dogma, and all 
resolutions of the TLA require the signed assent of the State President 
to be legally valid, ba~ically the Transkei has been given a mere 
constitutional apparatus. The Bantu Authorities Act and the 
composition of the TLA gave the chiefs a tight hold on Transkei politics, 
and the government retained its tight grip on the chiefs. The elected 
minority of the TLA depended on the chiefs if they hoped to operate at 
all effectively, even within the narrow confines of the Act. 
In addition, the state of emergency declared during the 
re'oellion in 1960 remained in force and has never been lifted. This 
gave the police arbitrary powers of search and detention, while chiefs 
were given control of the right to hold meetings in their districts, and 
were also empowered to banish people from their areas. (25) 
Politics in the Transkei, 1964-1970 
The 1963 election in the Transkei, for the 45 elected seats 
in the TLA, was fought without formal political parties. The campaigm, 
to the extent that there was one (the police and the frightened chiefs 
applied emergency powers rigorously), polarized around the contrasting 
personalities and outlooks of Chief Kaiser Matanzima, of the migrant 
Tembuland region, and Paramount Chief Victor Poto, of Nyanda region.(26) 
Most candidates declared themselves as supporters of one or other - 
Matanzima supporting separate development, and Poto insisting on a 
multi-racial Transkei within a multi-racial and unitary South Africa. 
In the event, Poto supporters won 33 of the 45 seats. (27) Nevertheless, 
Matanzima was elected Chief Minister by the TLA, as a result of the 
overwhelming support of the chiefs, many of whom were l1influencedl1 by 
the government. 
The election demonstrated the great bitterness of the populace 
against local apartheid policies and against the collaboration of most 
chiefs with the government in the implementation of these policies. The 
polarization of allegiance in the TLA, in the fora of a broad split 
between the elected members and the traditional Blite, dramatized this 
division between chief and subject. Further, the Poto supporters tended 
to be well educated (most in mission schools and several at university), 
articulate, and strongly sympathetic to the aspirations of African 
urban protest. (28) Matanzima's supporters tended to be less educated 
(many chiefs were uneducated) and to have a largely rural life 
experience. 
Nevertheless, although the resentment over Bantu Authorities 
was obvious, it did not necessarily indicate that chieftaincy had lost 
its institutional legitimacy in the Transkei. (29) Philip Mayer (30), 
for one, felt that the chiefs could still rehabilitate themselves in 
the eyes of their subjects, if only they could rid themselves of the 
image of being government stooges, implementing unpopular land policies 
and extorting fines. He noted that the Matanzima-Poto polarization 
represented not only apartheid against multi-racialism but also the 
harsh, "bad chiefn against the dignified, responsive "good chief". In 
addition, the election had shown a surprising voter adherence .to the 
wishes of the chief in many places - where such wishes had been made 
explicit. 
After the election, the two groups rapidly formed themselves 
into political parties, the Matanzima group calling itself the Transkei 
National Independence Party (TNIP) , and the Poto bloc the Democratic 
Party (DP). The new Transkei Cabinet included Matanzima's brother, 
George, the only other University graduate in the party. The other 
four Cabinet members (who all had strong links with the traditional 
elite) proved, with one exception, largely incompetent, and the TNrP 
remained, in consequence, very much a two-man party until the 1968 
election. 
By contrast, the DP boasted a large group of astute and 
personable politicians. Its core was a number of well educated, 
liberal Christians, led by Mr. Knowledge Guzana, a popular lawyer, a 
Fort Hare graduate, and a fine speaker. Guzana and Poto were very 
similar in character and outlook, and Guzana soon replaced the 
Paramount Chief as leader of the DP (in terms of party policy which 
opposed the inclusion of chiefs in the TLA and hence obligated the DP to 
choose a commoner as leader). (31) But the DP also included a militant 
wing which used the TLA to express the grievances felt nationally by all 
Africans. This group was exemplified by C. M. Nogcantsi and 
J. D. Nkosiyane, who repeatedly introduced motions condemning police 
powers, brutality by the chiefs and influx control and advocated the 
desirability of granting political asylum to refugees from the rest of 
the country. (32) The militants were not as well educated as, and 
definitely less rooted in the professional middle class than, the 
liberals. (33) Linking the two wings was Paramount Chief Sabata 
Dalindyebo of Tembuland (34), an outspoken critic of the government, who 
constantly referred to the Transkei venture as chicken-runff but was 
nevertheless prepared to participate in the TLA in opposition. 
From 1964 to 1966, the political process in the Transkei 
appeared to confirm government hopes (ad the predictions of those who 
regarded the Transkei as a fraud and a bluff). The TNIP repeatedly 
praised the government, asserted its support for separate development, 
attacked "Ghana c~mmunism'~, proclaimed the right of the chiefs to rule, 
and expressed the hope that eventual independence would be achieved 
after the suitable economic development of the region had been realized. 
Matanzima repeatedly stated the need for the races to live apart. The 
police moved swiftly against militants - an agent provocateur, for 
example, entrapping Nogcantsi and Nkosiyane. (35) 
The DP, for its part, vehemently rejected separate development, 
opposing the possible Balkanization of the country, and objected to the 
new role which the TLA gave the region's traditional aristocracy. In 
the latter instance, Poto insisted that the traditional dignity and role 
of the chieftaincy was degraded by the need to indulge in the political 
manipulations of the TLA; a firm believer in the role of the chief.as 
developed in tribal custom, he moved that a consultative Upper House of 
Chiefs should be created, with the TLA becoming a wholly elected body. 
Matanzima rejected what would have been the loss of his political support, 
and even the DP chiefs (pot0 and Sabata excepted) dragged their feet 
about relinquishing their new powers. The debate on the role of 
chieftaincy became an imnual ritual of the TLA. 
Thus, for the first three years, Africans angrily accused each 
other of selling out to the white man, debated the administration of an 
impoverished rural labour reservoir, allocated a miniscule budget, and 
employed the "separation or integration" debate in a separatist context, 
within segregated institutions. They were forced to debate the morality 
of apartheid - an issue long resolved for Africans - in institutions 
which were the creation of such a policy. In addition to this non- 
realistic political conflict, the basic inability of the TNIP 
membership to operate the new machinery of government effectively 
resulted in the white officials, seconded from Pretoria to occupy 
senior civil service positions, remaining effectively in control of all 
local administration. 
Nevertheless, a few events indicated that the TLA did have the 
ability to embarrass Pretoria. The most important of these was the 
almost unanimous vote to abolish Bantu Education in the Transkei. The 
intensity of popular dislike for this system, and the centrality of 
education to African aspirations, were such that the TNIP supported a 
DP measure to end it and create a new syllabus for Transkei schools. 
The refusal of the State President to give the measure his assent 
(which has not been given to date) led the TLA to decide to abolish the 
system, in practice anyway. (36) Matanzima also showed willingness to 
oppose the government on another issue which had resulted in widespread 
suffering - influx control. He repeatedly called on urban Africans to 
remain in the towns because there was no work for them in the Transkei, 
despite government pressure to force those Africans who did not work 
for whites to leave. In addition, though land rehabilitation schemes 
continued officially, there was growing evidence that many chiefs 
preferred to shelve them quietly rather than excite reprisals from their 
constituents. (37) 
In 1967 the TNIP Chief Whip, Shadrack Sinaba, resigned from 
the party after it had refused to support his calls for immediate 
independence for the Transkei. Sinaba, an urban African who had won a 
seat in 1963 as a Poto supporter but had joined the TNIP immediately, 
was joined by a DP backbencher, Cromwell Diko, in the creation of the 
Transkei People's Freedom Party (TPFP), which demanded immediate 
independence for the Transkei and characterized government policy as the 
perpetuation of oppression. ( 38) This development left Matanzima 
vulnerable on both flanks: he was a stooge because he supported 
apartheid, said the DP; and he was a stooge because Africans suffered 
oppression while he supported frwhite" rather than ffblackfl apartheid, 
said the TPFP. 
The result of the TPFJ? attack was to force the TNIP to defend 
its separatist constituency more militantly and frradicallyn. Matanzima 
became publicly more hostile towards the Pretoria government. He 
rejected immediate independence, calling for economic development first, 
and supported a 1968 motion in the TLA (from the new TNIP Chief Whip, 
M. H. Canca) demanding rapid development and independence for the 
Transkei Itin the shortest possible -Limerf. (39) Although the motion was 
curtly rebuffed by the government, Matanzima continued to call for 
rapid development, and also for the removal of all whites from the 
Transkei, the transfer of "theirw towns to the Transkei administration, 
and the Africanization of the Transkei civil service. He condemned 
whites for holding ffbaasskap attitudesff (40), which would no longer be 
tolerated by Africans in the Bantustans, and he pictured the DPvs 
insistence on a unitary South Africa as'a reactionary preference for 
continued white domination. 
Matanzima developed this manipulation of symbols of black 
exclusivism further during the 1968 Transkei election campaign, which 
followed the Canca motion. His main theme was that the DP had a slave 
mentality, preferring to remain subordinate to the whites rather than 
free in an independent Transkei, in which whites would have no rights, 
He also took to stumping the region with an old map of British 
Kaffraria which, he stated, represented the true land area of the 
Xhosa people; those parts which were in white hands (substantial and 
rich farmlands of the Eastern cape) should be l?returmed" to the 
African. In addition, he said, all Transkeian towns should also be 
returned to the Africans, including Port St. John, the region's only 
harbour, which had deliberately been excluded for all time from the 
Transkei by the government. Matanzima's claims also incorporated an 
old wish he had expressed that the Ciskei should be united with the 
Transkei; such a claim raised question marks against white towns like 
Queenstown and East London. (41) In addition, Matanzima continued to 
attack the whites living in the Transkei, calling for their departure, 
and the Africanization of the civil service. He accused the white 
civil servants of aiding the DP campaign. (42) The TNIP also placed 
great emphasis on the need for government to develop the area and 
create employment (43) more effectively than it had in the past; 
this, it was hoped, would undercut the TPFP platfom of immediate 
independence. 
Matanzima made a determined effort to recruit educated 
Transkeians as candidates for his party. He also pressured members of 
the Transkei chieftaincy to stand for election (rather than take their 
ex officio seats), reasoning that the people still felt great loyalty 
towards them. (44) And where the DP leadership was reluctant to expel 
rebels who stood as independents, the TNIP did not hesitate to expel 
such rebels, thus mininizing voter confusion. In addition, the chiefs 
used their local powers to help the TNIP, preventing DP meetings in 
some areas, the police harassed opposition organizers, and the TNIP 
used the resources of power, such as they were, to aid its campaign - 
Transkeian civil servants receiving a 35% pay increment just before the 
election. 
Nevertheless, the DP was not expected to lose its majority of 
the 45 elected seats. The TNIP, by winning 28 seats to the m's 14, 
thus scored a significant victory. (45) The pattern of results 
indicated that in almost all constituencies voters returned candidates 
who had the support of the local chief, where such a chief was not 
regarded as a government agent or stooge. (46) Thus the core of the DP 
seats was won in the regions over which Paramount Chiefs Poto and 
Sabata presided, while the TNIP won all seats in the regions ruled by 
Matanzima and his closest supporter, Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau. 
Where the chiefs remained in disrepute, or where candidates had great 
popularity by virtue of their opposition to white policies, the chiefs' 
power was less certain. (47) 
The DP lost most of its capable front bench. As Mqyer has 
intimated, the chiefs had regained the aliegiance of their subjects, 
partly through their ability to utilize their new powers to dispense 
local favours and punish recalcitrants, but also, in part, because the 
TNIP had projected apartheid as the way for Africans to rid themselves 
of white domination and exploitation. GUZ&, a moderate man, had 
suffered by appearing, in the Transkei context, to oppose the expulsion 
of whites - a charge which he was unable to rebut effectively, for 
personal and technical reasons. (48) 
For all that, the TNIP which won in 1968 was not the same 
party which had been Matalzima% personal machine before the election. 
In contrast to 1.963, several of the TNIP candidates were comparatively 
young, educated, and had been ltconventionalll African nationalists. 
Curnick Ndamse, for instance, was the outstanding new personality in 
-the post-election Cabinet. He had been a teacher at Fort Hare but, 
though accepting government policy, had been removed for criticizing 
its implementation,and had been banned. Matanzima had managed to gain 
the removal of this banning order, to enable Ndamse to stand for the 
TNIP, but the latter remained embittered by his experience. The most 
llnon-politicaln of the new Cabinet, Miss Stella Sigcau, was also a Fort 
Hare graduate, and the daughter of Botha Sigcau. But even she had been 
a member of the ANC Youth League while at University. The new Chief 
Whip of the party, T. E. Tshunungwa, had been one of the accused in the 
early stages of the Treason Trial in 1956. The TNIP thus had far 
closer links with the urban political experience of Africans than it 
had had before the election. And this was strengthened in 1969 when 
Matanzima's son, Mteto, succeeded to a chieftaincy and took his seat in 
the TLA; he had been a PAC activist at Fort Hare. 
Matanzima himself formed a link between the traditional and 
modern Qlites which now coexisted within his party. As a law graduate 
who strongly supported the institution of the chieftaincy, he was 
willing to l'modernizen that institution and cast it in the role of 
manipulating anti-white and separatist symbols. Matanaim's conception 
of chieftaincy was an activist one, committed to a political role and 
the search for popular electoral support - as distinct from rule by 
coercive support alone. In pursuing this view, he was able to portray 
the mission-educated DP elite as reactionary and unresponsive to local 
aspirations, to an overwhelmingly illiterate rural population. At the 
sane time, the Xhosa most likely to support Guzana, those living in the 
urban areas, showed almost no inclination to vote - repeating their 
abstention of 1963. (Indeed, the five urban candidates, including 
Sinaba and a DP front bencher, Rev. B. Rajuili, were all defeated. ) 
The 1968 election indicates that Matanzima did not feel he 
could afford to fight as a creature of the government, even had he 
wanted to. In fact, the TNIP went to great lengths to distance itself 
from many aspects of apartheid policy - especially influx control - and 
posited instead a version of apartheid aimed at the ultimate removal of 
all white influence from the Transkei. Matanzima has repeated since 
1963 that centuries of integration brought only white domination; he 
hoped to end it for the Transkei. But his insistence on prior economic 
development appears to have successfully answered the TPFP, which was 
eliminated. The election indicated that the Transkei Constitution Act 
furnished a po.tentia1 platform for Africans to present their grievances, 
which, inevitably, broadened to include national issues - such as 
education, land, passes and influx control, and the allocation of 
economic resources - in a situation in which other avenues of protest 
had effectively been sealed. (49) 
Although the TPFP challenge had ended, the debate between the 
DP and the TNIP did not revert to the pre-1967 ritual. The new middle 
class in the TNIP tended to accentuate {he demands which had been made 
daring the election canpaign. The result was that the issues raised did 
not disappear, but became more intense and assumed a more authentic 
nationalist symbolism. One reason for this was that the DP remained an 
effective opposition and, having won over 40% of the vote, continued to 
be an alternative focus of popular support. Moreover, the DP 
concentrated its criticism on the lack of economic development in the 
Transkei, thus seeking to usurp Matanzimals major platform. The TNTP 
escalated the tone of its demands to counter this strategy. (50) 
During 1969, the 'PNIP intensified its criticism of white 
domination. Guzana was forced to condemn it for rlfazuling the flames of 
African nationalismr1 and to deprecate Matanzima's vision of himself 
wielding the "big sjmbok and beating the whites into the sear1. (51) 
Such criticism was used by the TNLP to reinforce the image it had 
created of Gwana as a time-server for white interests. 
But the main impetus in the development of a language of 
black exclusivism came from Ndamse. In M q y  1969, he stated that what 
whites had conceded in the Transkei could never be revoked. 
"Go and tell everybody that we are not 
following Dr. Verwoerdls policy. He 
gdve us a springboard from which to 
spring to other pastures. ... We will 
accept no second-hand position ... We 
are going to get whatever the black 
man desires without a single shot being 
fired in the whole of South Africa." (52) 
In September, addressing white students at the University of 
Witwatersrand, Ndamse first praised several white liberals (including 
Pks. ~allinger) and then expressed his aims in the Transkei in language 
reminiscent of African leaders elsewhere on the continent (particularly 
%lawifs Dr. ~aslda): 
"In accepting the government1s good faith, 
we accept also that Transkei self- 
government is but the first down-papnent 
on the policy of separate development. 
We have been promised more land and we 
accept that the government will keep its 
word ... Africa is shaking off the shackles 
of centuries of enslavement ... The 
Transkei enables us to express the 
determination that the black man can regain 
his rightful place in his own land without ... 
any form of violence whatsoever ... a word 
about certain extremist politicians among 
our white fellow countrymen who believe the 
Transkei is getting too much ... These 
lovers of secluded privileges, the small 
frightened men, ... should save their breath. 
We have no ambition to go to Cape Town 
anymore - and if we did it would have to be ... 
along the road that goes via Umtata. In 
other words, we reject with contempt any 
suggestion that we should ever be 
represented by whites . . . I .take liberty and 
freedom from any hand as a hungry man would 
snatch a piece of bread. (53) 
Though Matanzima had, by the end of 1969, become jealous of Ndamse (and 
the attention accorded the latter by the white ~ress), he was under TNIP 
pressure to continue his demands on the government. On a visit to a 
Johannesburg location, Matanzima told his audience that if Bantustans 
could win independence and then lfform a federation" they would be able 
to deal with the whites from a position of strength. He has not 
repeated this statement, however. 
As if to emphasize the problems inherent in any attempt to 
please both the government in Pretoria and the people in the Transkei, 
a faction fight occurred early in 1969, in the Flagstaff district, in 
which 5 people were killed. The fight was the result of an attack on 
chiefs and headmen who were implementing land rehabilitation policies. 
The protest, involving the cutting of fences and destruction of 
enclosures, was led by the TNIP member of the TLA for Flagstaff, Babini 
Langa, supported by several headmen. (L- had been elected on a 
platform of opposition to land rehabilitation in an area which had been 
the centre of trouble in 1960 and where the chief S were unpopular. ) 
Langa was detained under Proclamation 400, losing his T U  seat as a 
result of absenteeism. He was released in 1970, in time to contest the 
by-election his detention had necessitated, and, despite being forced 
to stand as an independent, being harassed by chiefs, lacking any 
resources, m d  facing vigorous campaigning by Ma.tanzima and Ndamse, he 
won very easily (defeating also an outstanding DP candidate). The 
victory once again confirmed the anti-government preference of the 
voters . 
Given the poverty in the Transkei, the TNIP thus lives 
dangerously. To placate the government is likely to reactivate 
popular discontent in the area and to increase Matanzima's dependence 
on the police. On the other hand, to increase criticism of the 
government could lead the latter to lessen its support for Matanzima 
(in the form of finance and coercive capacity). This could leave 
Matanzima isolated if the TNIP failure to achieve real concessionc 
alienates support in any case. On the other hand, the South African 
government is unlikely to relish being seen to beat its own puppets 
for asserting the very independence which propaganda promises them - 
even assuming that it could find a viable alternative to Matanzima, 
which is unlikely. This would seem to give Matanzima some room for 
manoeuvre, but it is unlikely that he has equal latitude for the 
manipulation of the Transkei people - especially since the DP 
represents an older tradition of protest to which voters can return. 
Black Exclusivism and Social Change 
The events in the Transkei and the attitudes expressed by its 
leaders during the T U f s  first 7 years reveal the emergence of issues on 
which Africans hold positions in conflict with the notions of white 
privilege to which the South African government is committed. 
Significantly, these positions are not the monopoly of the opposition 
alone in the Transkei, but are increasirigly held by those who profess 
to support government policy. The DP, protected by the constitutional 
machinery created by the Nationalist Party government, is able to 
articulate some of the grievances for which African leaders are 
imprisoned in the urban areas. Further, the extent of its electoral 
support, even in defeat, indicates that such ideas and values do have 
some relevance, even to the m a l  population. 
More interestingly, the TNIP, officially committed to separate 
development, has inverted its tenets to propouild a racially exclusive, 
black "nationalism" (54), in an effort to a-tt~act support from its mass 
public and from sections of the middle class. The constitutional 
mechanism of the Transkei enables multi-racialism, radical in the urban 
context, to appear reactionary in the Bantustans. ILLthough the TNIF has 
largely juggled with vague, racist symbols, it has also made demands 
which are not easily manageable in terms of the strategy of conflict 
externalization. This strategy is aimed at zm arrangement in which 
African grievances will be channelled into rural areas, where such 
conflict does not make white interests vulnerable. In fact, the 'PICaIP 
platform has evolved into something only superficially con,ment with 
such expectations: it has challenged the white retention of 87% of the 
land of South Africa, by demanding substantial areas of the Eastern Cape; 
it has opposed attempts to keep the Trmskei a meaningless constitutional 
arrangement by seeking the rapid transfer of power to the area; and it 
has linked the demand for independence to internal. economic development, 
as opposed to border industries. Further, by seeking to ease inflw: 
control regulations, an end to the dumping of urban Africans in the 
Transkei, the right for the Transkei to orgmize its own police, 
military, information and health services, and by rejecting Bantu 
Education, the Transkei has in fact challenged several of the structures 
on which white control rests. 
Thus, from the perspective of the Trmskei, it would appear 
that attempts to displace conflict, and reorient it towards a non- 
realistic squabble between Africans, have only imperfectly been 
realized. And the fact that urban Africans have basically refused to 
participate in either the 1963 or 1968 elections indicates that, for 
them, the Bantus tans remain (predictably) a meaningless alternative to 
a place in a common society. In the urban areas where, despite influx 
control, the African population continues to grow, the South African 
government is still basically dependent on coercion as a means of 
conflict resolution. Bantustans would then appear to provide an 
additional platfom for grievance articulation, rather than an 
alternative one; conflict externalization may become conflict extension. 
Neither the Nationalist government nor its critics who 
regarded the Transkei as a fraud considered two factors. The first is 
that Africans in the Transkei (and other Bantustans [55]) might call 
the bluff: they might demand that the promises of apartheid rhetoric 
be honoured - as they have begun to do in the Transkei - a d  so make 
Bantustan politics meaningPul even while they remain economically 
ridiculous. Second, aYld far more important, the administrative changes 
in the area, and the more general process of social change which affects 
the Transkei as part of South Africa, have led to changes in role 
structures and relationships which inevitably affect political behaviour. 
The nature of the political role of the chiefs has been most 
affected. Bantu Authorities and the Transkei Constitution add new 
dimensions to this role. The chief is no longer merely the repository 
of traditional values and loyalties; the symbolic role, to which the 
institution had progressively become confined, has been elaborated 
under this legislation. The chief has been made a local administrator 
enforcing government regulations and policies on an unwilling public. 
He has also become a Transkei politician by virtue of his membership of 
the TLA and of a political party, His traditional role, involving 
responsibilities for land allocation, certain judicial functions, and 
the representation of formal and symbolic values, made him responsive 
to the needs and feelings of his subjects; he was a mediator between 
them and the white authorities. By contrast, his duties as a government 
local administrator under Bantu Authorities require him to implement 
unpopular policies in his area. In the context of land hunger and 
poverty, such policies are disruptive of the fabric of tribal life, and 
it is not surprising that B&u Authorities a m  the chief with coercive 
powers inconsistent with his traditional role. The third part he is 
called upon to play, that of legislator and politician,can reinforce 
either of the first two roles - but not both. The TLA provides an 
additional forum for his subjects to pressure the chief through their 
elected representatives - pressure to which the chiefs proved responsive 
during the 1968 election. The chief is thus forced to manipulate his 
traditional and local roles in the conduct of his behaviour as a 
politician. Where chiefs have rejected their Bantu Authorities roles 
(as in the case of Poto and ~abata) the problem of role conflict does 
not arise and they remain extremely popular. In the case of TNIP 
chiefs, however, there is an uneasy mixture of coercion and 
responsiveness occasionally resulting in popular unrest similar to that 
instanced in Flagstaff in 1969. Nevertheless, even the government 
chiefs are finding it easier to reconcile the demands of party politics 
with their traditional roles rather than with their Bantu Authorities 
duties. Whereas they relied heavily on the police in their local 
conduct up to 1963, they have come progressi~ely~under the influence of 
party politics and TLA needs, to minimize this role - especially in the 
application of land rehabilitation schemes. 
Nevertheless, the modem relationship between chief and 
peasant remains ambivalent, because it is still in the process of 
change. As in many parts of colonial Africa, the chief is still regarded 
by his subjects as a repository of traditional values, especially in a 
period of social change (in this case, where migrant labour, influx 
control, over-population and increasing landlessness decrease social 
stability and individual security) , and, paradoxically, at the same 
time, as a focus for grievances caused by the same process of change, 
which he is perceived to abet. (56) 
The violent response of the Transkei peasantry to Bantu 
Authorities in 1960 underlines the tension inherent in this changing 
relationship between chief and subject, and helps to account for the l 
need felt by the TNIP to seek popular support rather than rely on the 
police and their built-in majority in the TLA. Not only political 
power, but also traditional authority, is at stake in the relationship. 
!!he small educated elite is not new to the Transkei. But it 
has been enlarged by Bantustan policy. Educated Africans have been 
recruited to the Transkei1s bureaucracy and to the TNIP; others have 
arrived in the Transkei after being endorsed out of the towns. Several, 
as a result of embitteringpersonal experiences, have joined the TNIP 
to see if Balkanization is a possible means of escape from white 
domination. Unlike the 6lite Guzana represents, closely linked as it 
is to the Christian values of the mission schools, to urban aspirations, 
and to ideas of rnulti-racialism, the new additions to this middle class 
have a vested interest in separatism and black exclusivism - especially 
where it gives them Blitist employment, as in the case of the civil 
service. Though very small, the impact of such a group is far greater 
on a stagnant economic area such as the Transkei than it would be in 
the towns. The interest of this new group in separatism, allied to mass 
poverty and frustration, is likely to ensure that pressure on the TNIP 
chiefs to use the Transkei for a militant, black exclusivism increases. 
Although embryonic, the process, if it is assumed that policies like 
influx control persist while internal development remains minimal, is 
likely to ensure that conflict between the Transkei and the government 
continues to grow. 
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